Abstract. Many economic situations are modeled as stopping problems. Examples are timing of market entry decisions, search, and irreversible investment. We analyze a principalagent problem where the principal and the agent have dierent preferences over stopping rules. The agent privately observes a signal that inuences his own and the principal's payo. Based on his observation the agent decides when to stop. In order to inuence the agents stopping decision the principal chooses a transfer that conditions only on the time the agent stopped.
Introduction
Many economic situations are modeled as stopping problems. Examples are job search, timing of market entry decisions, or irreversible investment decisions. In an optimal stopping problem information arrives over time and a decision maker decides at every point in time whether to stop or continue. The stopping decision is irreversible and, thus, stopping today implies forgoing the option to stop later with a potentially larger return.
The literature on optimal stopping assumes that the decision maker observes all relevant information directly. There are, however, many economic environments modeled as optimal stopping problems where private information is a crucial feature. Important examples include the regulation of a rm that decides when to enter a market, or the design of unemployment benets when the worker privately observes his job oers. Consider for example a pharmaceutical rm that observes the stochastically changing demand for a new product and needs to decide on whether and when to enter the market for this product. If the rm starts selling the product, it pays an investment cost and receives the ow returns from selling the product at all future times. When timing its market entry decision, the rm solves an irreversible investment problem. As famously shown in the irreversible investment literature, it is optimal for the rm to delay investment beyond the point where the expected return of investing becomes positive (for an excellent introduction in the irreversible investment literature see Dixit and Pindyck 2008) . While this investment strategy is optimal for the rm, it is typically wasteful from a social perspective: As the rm does not internalize the consumer surplus, it will enter the market too late. A question that naturally arises is how a regulator can improve the incentives of the rm if the demand is private information of the rm. The result we derive in this paper implies that the regulator can always implement a socially ecient market entry decision through a simple posted-price-like-mechanisms that conditions on when the rm enters.
Our model is a dynamic principal-agent model. The agent privately observes a randomly changing signal and chooses a stopping rule. The principal observes the stopping decision of the agent, but not the signal. The principal commits to a transfer in order to inuence the agent's decision. Our main result is that under a single-crossing condition all cut-o rules can be implemented using transfers that condition only on the time the agent stopped.
As the transfer does not depend on private information of the agent it can be implemented without communication. This feature resembles a posted-price mechanism and makes our mechanism especially appealing from an applied perspective. Finally, we show that the minimal stopping rule that is optimal for the principal is a cut-o rule and thus can be implemented.
We establish our result as follows. First, we derive a dynamic single-crossing condition that ensures the monotonicity of the continuation gain in the agent's signal at a every point in time. A consequence of this monotonicity is that the incentive to stop is increasing in the type. Thus, to implement a cut-o rule it suces to provide incentives to the (marginal) cuto type. Intuitively, taking future transfers as given, the transfer providing incentives to the marginal type today could be calculated recursively. But as future transfers are endogenous, this recursive approach is dicult and requires the calculation of a value function at every point in time. We circumvent all these problems attached to the recursive approach by directly constructing transfers using reected stochastic processes. We dene a reected process as a Markov process that equals the original process as long as the latter stays below the cut-o. Once the original process exceeds the cut-o, the reected process follows its own dynamics and is dened to stay below the cut-o.
We show that every cut-o rule can be implemented through a transfer that equals the agent's expected payo evaluated at the process reected at the cut-o. To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to use reected processes in the context of mechanism design. We also believe that this paper contributes to the mathematical literature on optimal stopping as we are able to give a new, completely probabilistic sucient condition for optimal stopping rules.
The approach of this paper diers from the standard mechanism-design one, since we do not rely on the revelation principle and direct mechanisms. We do not use direct mechanisms in order to bypass technical problems that a formalization of the cheap talk protocol between the principal and the agent would entail: the agent would have to communicate with the principal constantly and, hence, the space of communication strategies would be very rich.
As optimal communication strategies are not necessarily Markovian, an optimization over those is a hard problem. The direct mechanism design approach, nevertheless, has been successfully used in general discrete-time settings in Bergemann and Välimäki (2010) for welfare maximization, in Pavan et al. (2012) for revenue maximization, or in continuous time to solve principal-agent problems in Sannikov (2008) and Williams (2011) . Surprisingly, it turns out that for optimal stopping problems the focus on posted-price mechanisms is not restrictive from a welfare perspective. We show that a principal-optimal full information stopping rule (rst best) is always implementable by posted-price mechanisms. Moreover, while direct mechanisms often require communication and a transfer at every point in time, our posted-price mechanism demands no communication and only a single transfer at the time of stopping.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In Section 3 we show that all cut-o rules are implementable using posted-price mechanisms and derive the transfer.
Furthermore Section 3 establishes that the minimal stopping rule that is optimal for the principal is a cut-o rule. Section 4 presents applications to irreversible investment, search, and proves that the classical static implementability result is a special case of our dynamic result. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
We rst give an informal presentation of the model before we present all the precise mathematical assumptions. There is a risk-neutral principal and a risk-neutral agent, who depending on the stopping rule τ and the signal receive X a payo of
The signal X is a Markov process which is only observed by the agent. Depending on his past observation of the signal the agent can decide at every point in time between stopping and continuing. In order to inuence the agents decision the principal commits to a transfer π that only conditions on the time the agent stopped. The transfer π implements the stopping rule τ if τ is optimal for the agent given he receives the transfer π in addition to his payos g and h
The next sections state the precise assumptions of the model. 1 We show later that discrete time models are a special case where we restrict the set of possible strategies.
We assume that jumps preserve the order of signals. At every point in time t a lower signal x ≤ x before a jump has a lower level after a jump 
The problem analyzed in the optimization theory literature is to nd an agent-optimal stopping rule, i.e. a stopping rule τ such that for all stopping rules τ ∈ T
To ensure that the optimization problem is well posed we assume that g and h are Lipschitz continuous and of polynomial growth in the x variable. Moreover we assume that g is twice dierentiable in the x variable and once in the t variable. Then the innitesimal
is well dened for every t and every x and we have the identity
Finally we assume that the payos of the agent satisfy the following single-crossing condition 2 Note that our model can easily extended to include a ow payo after stopping, i.e. payos of the form E
The dynamic single-crossing condition means that if after every history F t the expected change in the payo of the agent if he waits an innitesimal short time is decreasing in the
The dynamic single-crossing condition is a condition naturally satised in most optimal stopping problems. Examples in the economic literature are irreversible investment (Dixit and Pindyck 2008) , learning in one armed bandit models, job and other search problems as well as American options.
2.3. Information, Strategies and Payos of the Principal. Similar to the agent the principal is risk neutral and wants to maximize the functional W : T → R which is the sum of a ow payo β :
The payos α, β of the principal satisfy the same regularity assumptions as the payos of the agent g, h as well as the dynamic single-crossing condition. We call a stopping time τ principal-optimal if it maximizes the utility of the principal,
Note that the principal optimal stopping time (rst best) is the stopping time the principal would like to use if he observes the signal X. The principal however, does not observe the signal X. He only knows the distribution F of X 0 and the probability measure P describing the evolution of X, i.e µ, σ and γ. As the signal X is unobservable the principal has no information about the realized ow payos of the agent or the agents expectation about future payos. The only information the principal observes is the realized stopping decision of the agent. In order to inuence this decision she commits to a transfer scheme π : [0, T ] → R that depends only on the time the agent stopped. As the transfer only conditions on publicly observable information it requires no communication between the principal and the agent and can be interpreted as a posted-price.
We dene the set of stopping rules that are implementable through a transfer Denition 2 (Implementability). A stopping rule τ ∈ T is implemented by the transfer π if for all stopping rules τ ∈ T (2.4)
A transfer π implements the stopping rule τ if the stopping rule τ is optimal for the agent if he receives the transfer π in addition to his payos h and g. Implementability generalizes the notion of optimality for stopping rules, as a stopping rule is optimal if and only if it is implemented by a constant transfer. 
In this case we write τ = τ b . If b is càdlàg we call τ b a regular cut-o rule.
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In Section 3.2 we show that all regular cut-o rules are implementable. The associated transfer admits an explicit representation in terms of the reected version of X which we introduce in Section 3.1. Under the assumption, that the agent stops the rst time it is optimal to stop we show in Section 3.3 that every implementable stopping rule, is a cut-o rule.
3.1. Reected Processes. For a given barrier b : [0, T ] → R the reected version of X is a processX which evolves according to the same dynamics as X as long it is strictly below b but is pushed downwards any time it tries to exceed b. 
2) Until X hits the barrier both processes coincide: For every 0 ≤ t < τ b we have X t =X t a.s.
3 The denition of implementability does not require a regularity assumption on the transfer π ensuring that the resulting optimization problem of the agent is well posed, as all transfers that lead to an ill-posed optimization problem implement no stopping rule and thus are irrelevant. 3)X is always smaller than X: For every t ∈ [0, T ] we haveX t ≤ X t a.s. 4) When X hits the barrier,X is at b:
Moreover, we assume that for every stopping rule τ ∈ T and every F τ measurable random variable η there exists a process (X
6)X has the strong Markov Property: We haveX τ,Xτ t =X t a.s. for every t ∈ [τ, T ].
7) A higher value x ≥ x ofX at time t leads to higher values ofX at all later times s ≥ t:X 
Proof. Let π be given by Equation (3.1). To shorten notation we dene z(t, x) = h(t, x) + (Lg)(t, x). By the single-crossing condition x → z(t, x) is non-increasing. We need to show for all stopping times τ ∈ T
As X is a Feller process and the generator of g is well dened we can apply Dynkin's formula to get that (3.2) is equivalent to
First, we prove that the stopping min{τ, τ b } performs at least as well as τ. We readily
The comparison principle for the reected processX τ b ,b(τ b ) with the original process X yields for every time s ≥ τ b after the process hit the barrier that the reected process is not greater than the original process X s ≥X
As the reected processX is Markovian it follows
for all times s ≥ τ > τ b . By the comparison principle for reected processes we have that for all times s ≥ τ > τ b the reected process started in (τ, b(τ )) is not smaller than the reected process started in (τ,X
. These two inequalities combined with the monotonicity of z yield that for all τ b < τ
Hence conditional on τ b < τ the stopping rule τ b gives the agent a higher expected payo than the stopping rule τ
Consequently it is never optimal to continue after τ b . The agent is at least as well of if he uses the stopping rule min{τ,
Thus it suces to consider stopping rules τ ≤ τ b . We have Moreover, the Markov property of the reected process yieldsX
The monotonicity of z implies
3.3. All Implementable Stopping Rules are Cut-o Rules. For a xed transfer π and a xed time-t signal x = X t the agent's continuation value w π (t, x) is the increase in expected payo if the agent uses the optimal continuation strategy instead of stopping at time t
The continuation value satises the following properties.
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Lemma 6. The mapping x → w π (t, x) is non-increasing and Lipschitz continuous.
By denition the continuation value is non-negative. If the continuation value is positive it is never optimal for the agent to stop. If the continuation value equals zero it is optimal to stop immediately but potentially there exists another strategy that stops later and is also optimal. Clearly if the agent is indierent strategies that randomize over stopping and continuing are also optimal.
Denition 7 (Minimal Stopping Rule). We call a stopping time τ which is implemented by the transfer π minimal if and only if the agent stops the rst time it is optimal to stop, i.e.
The restriction to minimal stopping rules allows us to excludes non-generic cases. The next proposition shows only cut-o rules can be implemented using a transfer π if we assume that the agent stops the rst time it is optimal for him. 5 The monotonicity of x → w π (t, x) and the resulting form of the continuation region is shown in Jacka and Lynn (1992) for the case that X is a Itô diusion. Proposition 8. Let the stopping rule τ be implemented by the transfer π and minimal then τ is a cut-o rule.
Proof. We x a point in time t ∈ [0, T ] and introduce the stopping region D t = {x ∈ R|w π (t, x) = 0}. Let x ∈ D t and x ≥ x. Then Lemma 6 implies that the continuation value w π (t, x ) at x is smaller than the continuation value w π (t, x) at x and hence x is in the stopping region D t as well. This implies that D t is an interval which is unbounded on the right. By Lemma 6 the function x → w π (t, x) is continuous and hence D t is closed. Therefore
3.4. A Principal-Optimal Policy is Implementable. In this section we prove that a principal-optimal policy is implementable. A principal-optimal policy that maximizes the payo of the principal
Recall that we made no assumptions on the payos a, b of the principal, apart from dierentiability and the single-crossing assumption.
Theorem 9. There exists a principal-optimal stopping rule that is implementable.
Proof. Assume that the preferences of the principal and the agent are perfectly aligned V ≡ W . It follows from Proposition 8 that the minimal stopping rule implemented by the transfer of zero π ≡ 0 is a cut-o rule. As the preferences of the agent and the principal are the same it follows that the minimal principal-optimal stopping rule is a cut-o rule. By
Theorem 5 all cut-o rules can be implemented and it follows that the minimal principaloptimal stopping rule is implementable. Proof. Let π denote a continuously dierentiable transfer implementing the stopping rule τ b .
We assume that π(T ) = 0 and show that π is uniquely determined. The value function is dened by
Since g, h and π are suciently smooth it follows that v π is continuously dierentiable in t and twice continuously dierentiable in x for all x < b(t). Moreover, since τ b is an optimal stopping time in (3.3) the value function is also given by
In particular, at every point x < b(t) below the barrier it is optimal to continue, which implies that
On the barrier it is optimal to stop, which yields
Since the agent has to stop at time T we have for all x ∈ R (3.6)
Moreover the smooth pasting principle implies that (3.7)
Observe that by Ladyzhenskaja et al. (1968; Theorem 5.3 in Chapter 4) there exists a unique solution to Equations (3.4),(3.6) and (3.7). As these three equations do not depend on the transfer π the value function does not depend on π neither. So for all continuously dierentiable transfers π with π(T ) = 0 the associated value functions coincide v π = v. But by Equation (3.5) π is uniquely determined by π(t) = v π (t, b(t)) − g(t, b(t)).
Applications and Examples
4.1. Irreversible Investment and Regulation. In this section we present an application of our result to the classical irreversible investment literature. A pharmaceutical rm observes demand for a new product X. The demand X t is a geometric Brownian motion with drift dX t = X t µdt + X t σdW t , where 0 ≤ µ < r and σ > 0. If the rm starts selling the product at time t it pays continuous investment cost c : R + → R + and receives the ow returns from selling the product. The total expected payo of the rm equals
When timing its market entry decision the rm solves an irreversible investment problem. As famously shown in the irreversible investment literature (see for example Dixit and Pindyck (2008) ) it is optimal for the rm to delay investment beyond the point where the net present value −c(t) + e −rt Xt r−µ of investing becomes positive. While this behavior is optimal for the rm it is wasteful from a social perspective. Assume that the consumers discount at the same rate have an additional gain Γ > 0 from the pharmaceutical such that the overall benet of society equals
As the rm does not internalize the benet of the consumers it will enter the market too late.
Proposition 11. Let τ V = arg sup τ V (τ ) be the optimal stopping time of the rm and τ W = arg sup τ W (τ ) be the socially optimal stopping time, then we have that
A question that naturally arises is how a regulator could improve the incentives of the rm if demand is private information of the rm. By Theorem 1 we know that using a simple posted-price mechanisms the regulator can always implement the socially ecient market entry decision. In the next paragraph we will explicitly calculate the associated transfer π. Dene g(t, x) = e −rt x r−µ −c(t), the rm faces the maximization problem
Clearly (Lg)(t, x) is decreasing in x and thus the dynamic single-crossing condition is satised. The transfer is given by
s ds is the expectation of the reected processX .The function φ is the unique solution to the partial dierential equation
This allows one to easily calculate φ numerically.
4.2. Constant Processes and the Relation to Static Mechanism Design. In this section we show that for the special case of constant processes our setting reduces to the classical static mechanism design setting analyzed among others by Mirrlees (1971) and Guesnerie and Laont (1984) . We will explicitly construct the reected versionX of the process X. In this context the set of cut-o rules is equivalent to the set of monotone allocations and thus we recover the famous result that every monotone allocation is implementable.
Consider the case without ow transfers h ≡ 0. Let the signal X be constant after time zero, i.e. X t = X 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. As the signal is constant after time zero the private information is one dimensional. Consequently the outcome of any (deterministic) stopping rule τ depends only on the initial signal X 0 . Henceforth we deneτ : R → [0, T ] as a function of the initial signalτ (x) = E [τ |X 0 = x]. As the outcomeτ (X 0 ) depends only on the initial signal X 0 we can dene a transferπ : R → R that only conditions on X 0 byπ(x) = π(τ (x)) .
Implementability reduces to the following well known denition of static Implementability (Guesnerie and Laont (1984) , Denition 1) Denition 12 (Static Implementability). An allocation rule τ :
As famously shown by Mirrlees (1971) and Guesnerie and Laont (1984) any monotone decreasing allocation rule is implementable (Guesnerie and Laont (1984) , Theorem 2).
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Furthermore the transfers implementingτ are of the from
with some constant c ∈ R.
In the following paragraph we show how our dynamic single-crossing condition, cut-o rules and the transfer simplify to the results well-known from static mechanism design. The 6 Both Mirrlees and Guesnerie & Laont analyze a more general setting as they do not assume that the agent is risk-neutral or put dierently that his utility is linear in the transfer.
generator Lg equals (Lg)(t, x) = lim
Thus the dynamic single-crossing condition (1) simplies to ∂ ∂t g(t, x) decreasing in x for all t ∈ [0, T ] and all x ∈ R. As the process X is constant, for every barrier there exists a decreasing barrier that induces the same stopping time. Hence without loss of generality we restrict attention to decreasing barriers b. It is easy to check that for every decreasing barrier b a version of the process X reected at b is given bỹ
From the fact that the reected version of the processX t,b(t) s started on the barrier at time t stays on the barrier at all future times s > t follows that it is deterministic and given bỹ 
Finally we show that the transfer π(τ (x)) equals the transferπ(x) up to a constant.
Proof. Recall thatπ is given bŷ
for some constant c ∈ R. We x x ∈ [x, x] and computê From the fact that the reected version of the processX t,b(t) s started on the barrier at time t stays on the barrier at all future times s > t follows that it is deterministic and given bỹ Oers (w i ) i∈N are identically and independently distributed according to the distribution G : R → R. X s,t t is the best oer the agent got in the past, where we assume that the agent started with an oer of x ∈ R at time s
We assume that the agent receives a nal payo g(t, x) = e −rt x and a ow payo of zero.
The generator of g equals (Lg)(t, x) = −rx + λˆ∞
As G(z) ≤ 1 the generator is monotone decreasing in x and thus the single-crossing condition is satised. By denition the process X is monotone increasing and by equation (4.1) the transfer that implements a monotone cut-o b is given by
(1 − G(z))dzds .
4.5. Application to Optimal Stopping. As an immediate consequence of Theorem (5) we establish a link between reected processes and optimal stopping rules. If a stopping rule τ is implemented by a constant transfer, then τ is optimal in the stopping problem
This observation leads to the following purely probabilistic sucient condition for optimal stopping rules.
Corollary 14. Let b : [0, T ] → R be a barrier such that the reected process satises
Then the associated cut-o rule τ b solves the optimal stopping problem (4.2).
Conclusion
We have shown under weak assumptions that in optimal stopping settings a stopping rule that is optimal for the principal can be implemented by a simple posted-price mechanism.
The new approach we introduced is a forward construction of transfers. The transfer is the expected payo evaluated at the process reected at the time-dependent cut-o one wants to implement.
It is an interesting question for future research whether a similar approach can be used in environments where non cut-o rules are of interest. Two such situations arise naturally.
First, with multiple agents, the socially-ecient cut-o depends not only on time but also on the signals of the other agents. We think that a generalization of the method developed in this paper can be used to implement the principal-optimal behavior in this multi-agent settings. As the cut-o depends on the other agents' signals, one needs to dene processes reected at stochastic barriers. If one denes payments as expected payos evaluated at the process reected at the stochastic cut-o, we conjecture that our implementability result (Theorem 5) holds also for those generalized stochastic cut-os. The payment, however, will depend on the other agents' signals and, thus, the mechanism will require constant communication between the principal and the agents.
A second, more challenging, problem is revenue maximization. For special cases the revenue maximizing policy depends only on the initial and the current signal. In those cases one might be able to use the method developed here for revenue maximization by oering at time zero a menu of posted-price mechanisms.
Those extensions illustrate that posted-price transfers without communication are often insucient in more general dynamic setups. We hope, however, that due to its simplicity and the explicit characterization of transfers, our result will prove useful to introduce private information into the wide range of economic situations that are modeled as single-agent optimal stopping problems.
Let C denote the Lipschitz constants of h and g, i.e.
|h(t, x) − h(t, y)| + |g(t, x) − g(t, y)| ≤ C|x − y| The rst integral decomposes into the following terms, which we will consider successively. For t > 0 performing the same computations with the expectation taken conditional to F t yields for ξ 1 , ξ 2 ∈ L 2 (F t )
for all s ∈ [t, T ]. If ξ 1 ≤ ξ 2 this directly yields (3.1). Claim (3.1) follows by the same argument.
